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The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations:
Give It Up
Beth Van Schaack
A. Introduction
The extraterritorial application of states’ human rights obligations has emerged as a pressing
issue in international human rights law.1 And, it is destined to remain so given that states are
increasingly asserting their power abroad in ways that affect the rights of individuals beyond
national borders.2 Although not confined to this context,3 the debate has been most heated in
connection with modern-day armed conflicts that entail states deploying their troops and other
personnel on the territory of one or more other states but in confrontation with insurgents,
terrorists, and other non-state actors. Although transnational in their scope and impact,
international humanitarian law (IHL) considers these conflicts to be non-international armed
conflicts (NIACs), because they do not pit two or more High Contacting Parties of the 1949
Geneva Conventions against one another—the technical predicate for an international armed
conflict (IAC).4 Most conflicts in the world today are NIACs, yet the positive law governing
targeting decisions, detention operations, and the range of other issues that arise in these conflicts
is significantly less developed than that governing IACs. Moreover, these situations may evolve
in and out of full-blown conflict, effectively switching IHL on and off.5 The impulse to look to
human rights law to provide added constraints on state behavior, offer a remedy for victims of
violence, and fill lacunae in—or backstop—the applicable IHL is thus a compelling one. As a
result, the question of the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations has become
entangled in the choice of law debate over when human rights law applies in situations of armed
conflict that are also governed by IHL.6 In many of today’s transnational NIACs, however, the


Visiting Scholar, Center on International Security & Cooperation, Stanford University. By way of disclosure, I
served as Deputy in the Office of Global Criminal Justice of the U.S. Department of State from 2012-2013. My
office did not participate in the drafting of submissions to human rights bodies. The views expressed herein are
entirely my own and do not reflect the position of the State Department or the U.S. government.
1
Examples of the leading scholarship in this area are: MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); KAREN DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013).
2
Kal Raustiala, A Response to Milanovic, OPINIOJURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/02/a-response-to-milanovic/
(noting the increase in states’ “ability to project power at a distance, and to move people to distant places” as well as
conflicts that that seem “to bleed over to many discrete locations that are neither subject to pervasive armed conflict
nor are belligerently occupied”; all of which make “the extraterritorial application questions far harder, but also far
more pertinent.”).
3
The issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights law can also arise in connection with states’ policies
and conduct in the realms of immigration, trade, development, participation in international organizations, national
security outside of any armed conflict, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, foreign intelligence, and
law enforcement.
4
Article 2, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“GC IV”) (August
12, 1949), T.I.A.S. 3365.
5
Sarah Cleveland, A Response to Milanovic, OPINIOJURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/05/a-response-tomilanovic-2/.
6
A number of competing paradigms govern the question of when IHL displaces, or must be harmonized with, other
potentially applicable bodies of law, including human rights law and domestic law. For background see Charles P.
Trumbull, Filling the “Gaps” in the Law Applicable to Non-International Armed Conflicts, INTERCROSS,
1
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question of the extraterritorial application of human rights law must be resolved before it can be
determined which human rights obligations apply alongside any applicable IHL rules. This
article aims to focus on this antecedent question.
As domestic courts, international tribunals, and human rights treaty bodies increasingly confront
fact patterns and claims requiring a consideration of whether a particular human rights obligation
applies extraterritorially, they have struggled to create a defensible and coherent framework of
analysis. This process of doctrinal development and evolution has been decentralized to a
certain degree since the various human rights instruments contain slightly different formulations
for their scope of application, and there is no appellate body to harmonize the law. Nonetheless,
through a process of cross-fertilization and parallel reasoning, a doctrinal convergence is now
discernable within the opinions and other views of authoritative decision-makers representing the
range of human rights treaty bodies and tribunals that have confronted the issue. According to
this consensus, states owe human rights obligations to all individuals within the authority, power,
and control of their agents or instrumentalities and can be found responsible whenever they cause
harm to such individuals. In terms of which rights and obligations apply extraterritorially,
human rights bodies are increasingly adopting a calibrated approach that hinges on the nature of
the right, the degree of control the state exercises over the territory, individuals, or transaction in
question.
Starting in 1995, but more consistently during the Bush Administration, the United States has in
its filings before these human rights bodies7 advanced a categorical and contrarian position that
the obligations contained in the relevant human rights instruments have no extraterritorial
application.8 This unqualified position is increasingly out-of-step with the established
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/contemporary-ihl-challenges-use-force-and-non-international-armed-conflicts;
Beth Van Schaack, The Interface of IHL and IHR: A Taxonomy, JUSTSECURITY,
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/08/interface-ihl-ihr-taxonomy/.
7
A number of human rights treaties have established committees of independent experts who are charged with
supervising state compliance with treaty undertakings through periodic state reporting, the issuance of general
comments (akin to advisory opinions) and reports, and quasi-adjudicatory claims procedures undertaken in
connection with individual petitions. Given its ratification status, the United States is subject to four out of the eight
of these bodies operating under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights: the Human Rights
Committee (which monitors the ICCPR), the Committee Against Torture (which monitors the Torture Convention),
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (same for the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the US has ratified two Optional Protocols to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) but not the parent treaty). The United States has not yet ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, or the UN
Committee on Migrant Workers and their Families, each of which has a corresponding experts committee. In
addition, the United States is also subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the International Labor Organization’s
Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of Association and—by virtue of its membership of the
Organization of American States (OAS)—the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), although it
contests the full reach of that Commission as will be discussed. The Human Rights Committee, which monitors the
ICCPR, accepts individual petitions; however, the United States has not ratified the necessary Optional Protocol.
See generally Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in
THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 210 (Cesare P.R.
Romano, Ed. 2009).
8
Most recently, in the face of a proposal by Brazil and Germany to recognize an international right to privacy, the
United States succeeded in ensuring that the final General Assembly resolution did not mention any extraterritorial
impact. See Colum Lynch, Inside America’s Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights Everywhere, FOREIGN POLICY
2
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jurisprudence and with arguments being advanced, and conceded, by our coalition partners and
other allies.9 As such, the United States now finds itself in a knotty adversarial posture with
several human rights bodies on this issue and the related choice of law question.10
This firm stance confirms the United States as a persistent objector to any emerging customary
norm. Nonetheless, the failure to acknowledge limited, well-established, and principled
exceptions to a strictly territorial application of its human rights obligations ultimately
undermines the legitimacy of U.S. arguments in these fora as well as its commitment to the
human rights project more broadly. The upcoming hearings before the Human Rights
Committee (HRC)—the treaty body charged with interpreting the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—offer an opportunity for the Obama Administration to
advance a more nuanced position that allows it to remain faithful to its lex specialis arguments,
but also to make certain strategic concessions on extraterritoriality.11 The proposed shift in
approach will demonstrate the United States’ respect for the views of human rights bodies and of
its allies, bolster the universality of certain core human rights protections, and do much to bring
to a close a historical chapter marred by allegations that the United States was endeavoring to
create, and exploit, rights-free zones. Furthermore, the change of course advocated will not
prejudice, and may actually enhance, more meritorious arguments at the United States’ disposal.
This dispute is more than a simple matter of competing semantics and treaty interpretations that
will be resolved by clever exercises of statutory interpretation or a more searching review of the
legislative history. Rather, there are broad philosophical principles at issue that go to the very
heart of the human rights project. In particular, this debate surfaces a perennial tension between
the idealized vision of human rights as universal attributes that we all enjoy simply by virtue of
our shared humanity and the more realist view that human rights obligations are merely
contractual undertakings that are binding only insofar as states have specifically consented to
them as a function of pacta sunt servanda. And yet, the applicable texts are open to several
equally plausible interpretations, and the legislative history is inconclusive as to states’ original
intentions; this indeterminacy invites a teleological interpretive approach that must prioritize
universality. The law has headed in a direction that is consistent with this imperative and is
keeping pace with globalization and multitude of ways that states can assert their power abroad.
(Nov. 20, 2013) (“American diplomats are pushing hard to kill a provision of the Brazilian and German draft which
states that ‘extraterritorial surveillance’ and mass interception of communications, personal information, and
metadata may constitute a violation of human rights. … The United States negotiators have been pressing their case
behind the scenes, raising concerns that the assertion of extraterritorial human rights could constrain America’s
effort to go after international terrorists.”).
9
See Cleveland, supra note ___ (cataloging submissions by United States allies). The U.S. position is closest to that
advanced by the Government of Israel, given that the issue of extraterritoriality of human rights obligations has deep
implications with respect to the occupied territories, along with Canada and the United Kingdom. On Israel’s
position, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004 (9 July 2004), ¶ 110.
10
See Geneva 001769, UN Human Rights Committee—USG July 17018 Public Hearing, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131739.pdf, ¶¶ 11-12 (delegation cable noting that the HRC had
“pointedly critical” questions and comments and was “strongly opposed to the United States’ longstanding and
principled legal interpretation (which the delegation resolutely defended) that the Covenant does not apply to
activities of States Parties outside their territory”).
11
These proceedings were originally scheduled for November, 2013, but the sequester negotiations prevented the
U.S. delegation from traveling. CITATION.
3

This is fitting, because the alternative—that the treaties would permit states to harm people
abroad in ways that would be prohibited at home—is untenable and perverse.
The United States’ so-called legal position actually reflects a strategic policy choice to endeavor
to evade scrutiny of its extraterritorial exploits on the merits. Given that there are welldeveloped arguments that its conduct in the range of conflicts in which it finds itself is in full
compliance with applicable law—be it human rights law or humanitarian law12—the United
States should have nothing to fear from relinquishing a threshold argument that is increasingly
untenable in light of the prevailing practice, law, and theory. Indeed, by abandoning this dead
letter, the United States will increase the legitimacy of other arguments in its defense, including
its lex specialis arguments in favor of the application of IHL over human rights law in the
situations of greatest concern to the United States: the conduct of military operations abroad,
including through the use of remotely piloted vehicles.
This paper proceeds in four steps. By way of background, it quickly reviews the relevant treaty
language and travaux préparatoires. With reference to exemplary decisions, it then maps the
process of doctrinal development across the array of human rights treaty bodies and international
tribunals (with a nod to some relevant domestic pronouncements) in order to identify the
expanding areas of doctrinal consensus. Against this backdrop, it presents the United States’
rhetorical positions before several human rights bodies. By way of prescription and conclusion,
it suggests some subtle concessions the United States could make in the forthcoming
consultations before the Human Rights Committee, where it has reached a “stalemate” on this
question.13 Although at first glance the United States position appears deeply entrenched, subtle
cues in the United States’ most recent submission to the HRC suggests that its position on these
issues may be softening and that the time for such a shift in approach may be ripe.
B. The Texts & Their Origins
The various human rights treaties and instruments contain slightly different formulations for their
scope of application. Several hortatory pronouncements, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), do not contain any jurisdictional limitations at all, framing their
articulated rights as universally applicable to all persons under all circumstances.14 This is also

12

See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, American Society of
International Law (25 Mar. 2010). http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
13
See Cleveland, supra note ___.
14
Article 2 of the UDHR states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis
of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty.
The 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man similarly states at Article II: “All persons are equal
before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language,
creed or any other factor.”
4

the approach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols15 as well as the 1948 Genocide
Convention.16 Similarly, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) does not contain a jurisdictional clause and actually obliges states parties to
take steps individually and through “international assistance and cooperation” to progressively
realize the Covenant’s rights.17 By contrast, the rest of the human rights treaties, many of which
are subject to enforcement or interpretation by a supranational court or expert body, do contain
jurisdictional limitations. The most common formulation relies on the concept of the state
party’s “jurisdiction”, which is susceptible to multiple interpretations beyond merely the state
party’s “territory.”18 For example, several treaties impose their obligations with respect to all
“territory under [the state party’s] jurisdiction”19 implying that the two terms are not
synonymous. Indeed, none of these treaties is expressly territorial in the sense contemplated by
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.20
The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) decisions concerning the European Convention
on Human Rights—which are enforceable against states within the Council of Europe—have
been highly salient in this debate. The most important treaty from the United States’ perspective,
however, is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), so this paper will
conduct a deeper dive into its text, origins, and subsequent interpretation. That said, many of our
key allies and coalition partners are subject to the European Convention and Court, and so the
latter’s jurisprudence will be scrutinized in so far as it impacts and is consistent with the
direction the law has moved.

15

For example, Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides: “The High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” GC IV, supra note ___.
16
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Res. 260 (III) (9 Dec. 1948); Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Prel. Obj., Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996 (11 July 1996), at ¶ 31 (“[T]he rights and
obligations enshrined in the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes. … [T]he obligation each state has
to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention.”).
17
Article 2(1) provides in full:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures.
18

Article 1 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights reads: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.” Article 2 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child makes reference to the duty of states parties to both respect and to ensure the
enumerated rights to “each child within their jurisdiction.”
19
The 1966 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination provides at Article 3 that: “States Parties
particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit, and eradicate all practices
of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.” Similarly, the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture (Article
2(1)) states: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” The treaty also confirms at Article 2(2) that a state of war
cannot be invoked to justify acts of torture.
20
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. Article 29 reads:
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party
in respect of its entire territory.”
5

The ICCPR, which opened for signature in 1966, contains a unique and enigmatic formulation,
in which much turns on the meaning of the second “and” in Article 2(1), italicized below:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind…21
This formulation is susceptible to three competing interpretations. The first reading of Article
2(1) is a conjunctive one advanced by the United States to mean that a state subject to the ICCPR
owe duties only to those individuals who are within both its territory and its jurisdiction. This
interpretation, while perhaps most semantically natural one, creates some conceptual oddities
with certain Covenant rights, such as the right to return to one’s country enshrined in Article
12(4).22 A disjunctive interpretation of Article 2(1) yields the more expansive conclusion that
the Convention actually applies to two classes of individual: persons within the state’s territory
as well as persons within the state’s jurisdiction. In any case, to avoid surplusage, both
approaches depend on the ability to identify examples of persons who are within a state’s
territory, but not its jurisdiction, and vice versa. The former would, under certain circumstances,
include diplomats assigned to international organizations as well as persons on a portion of the
territory of a state party that is controlled by a rebel or insurrectionist entity or is otherwise
outside of the central government’s jurisdiction in the sense of power or effective control.
Although such cases arise, the case law is more often concerned with identifying the latter class
of persons: those individuals who are not within the state’s territory but are nonetheless within its
jurisdiction.
In 2005, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment 31, an omnibus opinion on the
“Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant.”23 The
Committee adopted the first disjunctive approach to Article 2(1) when it wrote:
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction.24
Finally, an alternative disjunctive approach to Article 2(1) has emerged whereby the territorial
clause modifies only the obligation to “ensure” Covenant rights (in the sense of taking positive
21

Article 7 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, adopted by GA Res. 45/158 (18 Dec. 1990), contains a more expressly disjunctive formula:
States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments concerning human
rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention without
distinction of any kind ...
22

See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR COMMENTARY 43 (2d ed. 2005)
(“An expressly literal reading would … lead to often absurd results.”).
23
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). General comments are authoritative
but technically non-binding pronouncements on treaty interpretation.
24
Id. at ¶ 10.
6

steps to give effect to rights and to prevent and redress the violation of those rights by third
parties), which would apply only to individuals within states’ territory and subject to their
jurisdiction. States would be obliged to “respect” the rights set forth in the Covenant under all
circumstances, without territorial limitation.25 This distinction between what have been called
negative and positive obligations finds some affinity in the formulation of the contemporaneous
American Convention on Human Rights (1969), which embodied within a treaty many of the
rights contained in the American Declaration. The American Convention states at Article 1(1)
that:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination …26
Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 1 identifies the obligation to
“secure” the enumerated rights and freedoms within states’ jurisdiction, potentially taking for
granted—as argued by one commentator—that the obligation to “respect” those rights is
susceptible to no jurisdictional limitation.27 In all these formulae, much hinges on what it means
to be within a state’s “jurisdiction.”
The legislative history of these instruments provides some insight into the intentions of the states
that negotiated the core texts. During the drafting of the ICCPR, it was the United States
delegation that proposed the addition of “within its territory” to Article 2(1), which originally
only made reference to states’ “jurisdiction.”28 The United States was particularly concerned
with the prospect of assuming obligations to adopt legislation that would guarantee the rights
contained in the Covenant to residents of territory occupied since World War II but gradually
being transitioned to local authorities.29 There was also a concern about individuals asserting
25

Rolf Künnemann, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 201, 228-9 (Fons
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga Eds., 2004); Milanovic, supra note ___ (“I thus argue that while the
state’s overarching positive obligation to secure or ensure human rights even from violations by private
actors should be conditioned by a spatial notion of jurisdiction as control of an area, since in the
overwhelming majority of cases the state would need such control to effectively comply with its
obligations, its negative obligations—e.g. not to kill an individual without sufficient justification—should
be territorially unlimited, since the state can always refrain from a specific act”).
26
The Convention also contains a most favored rights clause at Article 29 providing that nothing in the treaty should
be interpreted as restricting the enjoyment of the enumerated rights or freedoms or precluding other rights that are
inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy.
27
Künnemann, supra note ___, at 229. The title of this provision, however, is “Obligation to Respect Human
Rights” (emphasis mine).
28
See NOWAK, supra note __, at 30-34. The reference to persons within the state’s “jurisdiction” replaced a
reference to persons residing in a state’s “territory” in the European Convention during the drafting period. See Rick
Lawson, Life After Banković: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 82, 88 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga
Eds., 2004).
29
Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 123-24 (2005) (noting Eleanor Roosevelt’s unwillingness to assume
“an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in [the Covenant] to the citizens of countries under United States
occupation” by requiring it to enact legislation concerning those persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of the
occupying state in some respects, but not others); see also DA COSTA, supra note ___, at 24-40.
7

rights against their state of origin beyond those that could be fulfilled through standard
diplomatic protection measures and that would otherwise fall under the competence of the state
of residence.30 Other delegations—primarily concerned with confirming that states retain
obligations to guarantee the Covenant’s rights to their own citizens abroad—unsuccessfully
opposed the proposed amendment.31
Although drafters finally reached a consensus as to the textual formulation of Article 2, this
accord does not necessarily evince a consensus as to how that language should be interpreted;
that question may have deliberately been left ambiguous. This obscured plurality of views is, of
course, the risk of joining any multilateral regime. Thus, given that the text is susceptible to
multiple interpretations, it may be of no moment that the contemporary approach runs counter to
the United States’ expectations. All told, commentators who have really dug into the archives
have determined that the travaux are inconclusive as to the full intent of the drafters, but—at a
minimum—these records do not express a clear sentiment the Covenant should never apply
extraterritorially.32 In any case, by the time of U.S. ratification, the HRC had already opined on
the extraterritorial application of the Covenant.33 Nevertheless, this issue was not raised when
the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, even though the Senate attached a number of
reservations, declarations, and understandings.34
Although a semantic analysis of these texts coupled with careful resort to their legislative
histories provides some insights of relevance, no definitive conclusion as to the treaties’
extraterritorial reach can be discerned. Moreover, although they were concerned with cabining
the treaty’s impact on situations of occupation, the delegations involved in the drafting
negotiations were not sufficiently prescient to contemplate all the potential situations in which
the question of extraterritorial obligations might arise. When language is indefinite, either
inadvertently or by design, state representatives in effect delegate interpretive authority to courts
and other enforcement bodies. As such, it has been left to the various judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies with responsibility for administering, interpreting, and ensuring compliance with the
treaties and other instruments to determine the full scope of their extraterritorial reach, with
reference to the instruments’ object and purpose as well as subsequent state practice.35
30

Legal Consequences, supra note ___, at ¶ 109.
Dennis, supra note___, at 124.
32
Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application Of The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights,
in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 41, 66-67 (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga Eds., 2004).
33
See, e.g., Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (29 July 1981).
34
U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138
Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html.
35
Article 31, Vienna Convention, supra note___. Human rights treaties are particularly susceptible to this
teleological interpretative approach. For example, the ECHR has made clear that the European Convention is a
“living instrument” that must be interpreted in light of contemporary realities. Loizidou v. Turkey,
Judgment/Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89 (23 Mar. 1995), at ¶ 71 (“these provisions [governing both
substance and enforcement] cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as
expressed more than forty years ago.”); Soering, supra note __, at ¶ 87 (“the object and purpose of the Convention
as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied
so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. ... In addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed has to be consistent with ‘the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’) (citations removed).
31
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C. The Jurisprudence
The “jurisprudence” in this area has evolved rather haphazardly in the face of idiosyncratic fact
patterns that have come before different human rights treaty bodies and international tribunals in
a range of conflict and non-conflict situations.36 The ECHR’s jurisprudence tends to receive the
most attention in this field, but its case law is enhanced and informed by pronouncements by the
Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Committee
Against Torture, and other such bodies.37 To be sure, many decision-makers preface their
assertions of jurisdiction with the observation that human rights obligations are primarily
territorial, suggesting what amounts to a presumption against extraterritoriality unless one of the
identified exceptions has been proven. The ECHR is the most wedded to this meme—insisting
on the “essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction” with “other bases of jurisdiction being
exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.”38
That said, a longitudinal review of the cases reveals a distinct trend toward an understanding that
states’ human rights obligations follow their agents and instrumentalities offshore whenever they
are in a position to respect, or to violate, the rights of individuals they confront abroad. Even the
ECHR is gradually bending toward the reasoning of its sister interpretive bodies. As a result, at
this point in time, the reach of these various instruments is largely co-extensive, and it is possible
to identify a taxonomy of situations in which there is a consensus that states’ human rights
obligations apply extraterritorially. Even within the ECHR jurisprudence, these so-called
exceptions are sufficiently numerous and diverse such that the default position is more pocked
than plenary. Some variation continues to exist, however, in the hard cases: when states engage
in remote extrajudicial killings.
1. Territorial Actions With Extraterritorial Implications or Effects
One discrete class of situations involves acts committed domestically that have extraterritorial
human rights implications or effects—so-called indirect extraterritorial effect cases.39 This
theory of extraterritoriality developed in connection with decisions to extradite, deport, or
otherwise remove individuals to countries where they may not enjoy the panoply of due process

36

United Nations political bodies have also weighed in on this issue. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Res.
1991/67, Doc. E/CN.4/1991/91 (6 Mar. 1991) (condemning Iraq’s grave violations of human rights against the
Kuwaiti people in violation of the UN Charter, human rights treaties, and other relevant legal instruments, and
appointing a special rapporteur to investigate the situation of human rights under Iraqi occupation); GA Res. 45/170,
The Situation of Human Rights in Occupied Kuwait (18 Dec. 1990), at ¶¶ 1, 9 (condemning human rights violations
against the Kuwaiti people and asking the Commission on Human Rights to examine the human rights situation in
Kuwait). By contrast, the Security Council simply reaffirmed Iraq’s responsibility under international humanitarian
law, including GC IV. See U.N. Sec. C. Res. 666 (prmbl) (13 Sept. 1990). The General Assembly has similarly
called upon Israel to adhere to its human rights obligations in the occupied territories, although that is obviously a
special case. See, e.g., GA Res. 2443 (XXII) (Dec. 19, 1968).
37
For a fuller survey of these cases, see Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When do Human Rights
Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritoriality?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011).
38
Banković, supra note ___, at ¶ 61.
39
DA COSTA, supra note ___, at 57.
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protections40 or where they may be subject to the death penalty.41 The Human Rights Council in
a General Comment reinforced this line of cases when it wrote:
the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person
from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is
a real risk of irreparable harm … either in the country to which removal is to be
effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.42
These cases turn on two elements: the state’s exclusive control over the putative victim with
respect to the decision and destination—even though it may exercise no control over the
individual once he or she leaves the state’s territory—and the foreseeability of the extraterritorial
rights violation within the destination state.43 The state’s liability is traceable to the fact that it
operates as “a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another
jurisdiction.”44 This brand of extraterritorial jurisdiction can exist even when a statutory scheme
enacted by the state party has certain deleterious effects on individuals residing elsewhere.45
At the same time, and by way of limiting principle, courts and other bodies have generally
rejected an unrestricted effects test.46 As such, simply being affected abroad by an act
40

See Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 15576/89 (20 Mar. 1991) (finding no violation
of the Convention where Chilean citizens were refused refugee status and ordered expelled).
41
Soering v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), at ¶ 91 (“liability [may be]
incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence
the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment”); Ng v. Canada, HRC, Comm. No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (7 Jan. 1994), at ¶ 6.2 (“if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its
jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that this person’s rights under the Covenant will be
violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows from the fact
that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the handing over of a person to another
State (whether a State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the
very purpose of the handing over.”); Kindler v. Canada, HRC, Comm. No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (11 Nov. 1993), at ¶ 6.2 (same); A.R.J. v. Australia, HRC, Comm. No. 692/1996, U.N Doc.
CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (28 July 1997), at ¶¶ 6.12-6.15 (determining that a violation of due process rights was not a
necessary and foreseeable consequence of petitioner’s return to Iran).
42
General Comment No. 31, supra note ___, at ¶ 12.
43
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 61498/08 (4 Oct. 2010), at ¶ 123
(finding potential liability when individuals are transferred between states where “substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to” ill-treatment).
44
Munaf v. Romania, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (21 Aug. 2009), at ¶ 14.2. In Munaf, the
government attempted to argue that the petitioner was never actually in its custody, although he was in a Romanian
embassy when he was handed over to U.S. military personnel, who allegedly mistreated him. Id. at ¶¶ 4.10-4.12, 7.5.
The HRC instead found that the harm to Munaf would not have been foreseeable to Romania at the time and so
Romania bore no responsibility. Id. at ¶¶ 14.2-14.6.
45
Ibrahim Gueye et al. v. France, HRC, Comm. No. 196/1985, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (6 April 1989),
at ¶¶ 9.3-9.5 (finding Senegalese petitioners within France’s jurisdiction when they relied on French legislation for
their pension rights).
46
See Banković, supra note ___, at 75 (“The Court considers that the applicants’ submission is tantamount to
arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act
may have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the
purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.”). To be fair, the Court somewhat unfairly recharacterized the petitioners’
arguments in this regard. See infra text accompanying note ___ (setting forth petitioners’ arguments).
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attributable to a state (e.g., a diminution of foreign aid) is insufficient to trigger that state’s
human rights obligations abroad. Because these cases involve state action that is essentially
local (such as a decision to extradite an individual abroad), they are of a different order than the
more contentious situations involving state agents acting overseas.
2. Consular Actions
There is also a discrete set of cases challenging the actions of diplomats and other consular
representatives operating abroad.47 Many of these decisions turn on the right in question (e.g.,
the right to return to one’s country, which inevitably applies beyond national territory) as well as
the fact that the transaction in question (e.g., the re-issuance of a passport) is within the exclusive
control or authority of the state representatives.48
3. Occupation & Control of Territory
Turning to situations that involve a state’s extraterritorial conduct stricto sensu, the easiest
scenarios are those in which one state exercises plenary control and authority over physical
territory within the borders of another state. Although this can occur when one state exercises
effective control over an area with the “consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of
that territory,”49 the classic such scenario is one of occupation, when an occupying power—
having removed or displaced the local authorities—is under a duty to maintain order and to
provide for basic needs of the local populace until some indigenous civil authority can resume

47

See Montero v. Uruguay, HRC, Comm. No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, (1990). Uruguay had failed to
reissue the applicant’s passport in Germany. The HRC found the claim to be admissible on the following reasoning:
The issue of a passport to a Uruguayan citizen is clearly a matter within the jurisdiction of the
Uruguayan authorities and he is “subject to the jurisdiction” of Uruguay for that purpose.
Moreover, a passport is a means of enabling him “to leave any country including his own”, as
required by article 12(2) of the Covenant. Consequently, the Committee found that it followed
from the very nature of that right that, in the case of a citizen resident abroad, it imposed
obligations both on the State of residence and on the State of nationality and that, therefore, article
2 (1) of the Covenant could not be interpreted as limiting the obligations of Uruguay under article
12 (2) to citizens within its own territory.
Id. at ¶ 5 (finding the confiscation of a passport of a Uruguayan citizen by the Uruguayan consulate in
Germany to be a violation of the right to leave any country, including her own (Article 12(2)).
48
See W.M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, EComm’nHR (14 October 1993), at ¶ 1 (“authorized agents of a State,
including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the
extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property. In so far as they affect such persons or property by
their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged.”) (unpubl. op.); Lichtensztein v. Uruguay, HRC,
Comm. No. 77/1980 (31 Mar. 1983); Dixit v. Australia, HRC, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/77/D/978/2001 (28 April 2003)
(allegations regarding discriminatory acts of immigration officials deemed inadmissible for failure to exhaust local
remedies).
49
Banković, supra note ___, at ¶ 71. In Al-Skeini, the UK Court of Appeals somewhat inexplicably held that that
human rights obligations should not apply extraterritorially when the foreign actor is present without the consent of
the territorial state, because such application might result in a violation of the territorial state’s sovereignty. Case of
Al-Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Judgment (July 7, 2011), at ¶ 80 (discussing the
holding of the UK Court of Appeal). This privileging of the sovereign right to non-interference of the territorial
state over the human rights of the victims has not been widely shared beyond these two judgments.
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those responsibilities.50 These extraterritorial obligations can exist even when actual authority is
exercised by a local administration under the control of the foreign state.51 The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) confronted a de facto occupation scenario in the Armed Activities case,
wherein it found Uganda liable not only for abuses by its own troops but also for failing to
protect the inhabitants from abuses by violent non-state actors not under Uganda’s authority.52
Inversely, enforcement bodies will effectively let states off the hook in situations in which they
do not exercise control or authority on their own territories as a result of foreign occupation.53
It is often assumed the occupier bears responsibility for securing the entire range of substantive
rights in the territory in question,54 especially during prolonged occupations.55 Placing human
50

EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 105 (1993) (describing the Fourth Geneva
Convention as “a bill of rights” for the occupied population). In Al-Skeini, however, the United Kingdom conceded
that the region in question was within British military responsibility; nonetheless, it argued that it did not have
sufficient troops or resources on the ground to exercise effective control over the territory in question or the local
civilian administration. Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 112. It also conceded jurisdiction over British-run prison
facilities in Iraq, but not over any actions undertaken in the military vehicle transporting detainees to those facilities.
Id. at ¶ 118.
51
In Loizidou, Turkey argued that the acts in question were attributable to an autonomous local administration. The
Court rejected this, however, by reasoning:
when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—[a Contracting State]
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such
an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local
administration.
Loizidou, supra note ___, at ¶ 69. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, ECHR, App. No. 25781/94, Judgment (10 May 2001)
at ¶ 77 (“Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility cannot be confined to the
acts of its own soldiers or officials … [b]ut must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration
which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support.”).
52
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Rep.
2005, 179 (19 Dec. 2005).
53
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Cyprus, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 88 (6 Aug.
1998), at ¶ 3 (“the State party, as a consequence of events that occurred in 1974 and resulted in the occupation of
part of the territory of Cyprus, is still not in a position to exercise control over all of its territory and consequently
cannot ensure the application of the Covenant in areas not under its jurisdiction.”). This may also occur in situations
in which a state dissolves into constitutive parts that exercise only tenuous control over parts of their newly-acquired
territory. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.14 (1992), at ¶¶ 4-5 (noting with approval that while Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exercise “factual
and effective control” over its entire territory, it nonetheless considered itself legally responsible for all parts of its
territory).
54
Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note ___, at ¶ 77 (because Turkey had effective control over Northern Cyprus, and
because its control was plenary, it was obliged to secure the entire range of substantive Convention Rights: …
“Turkey’s ‘jurisdiction’ must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights … and …
violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.”). The ECHR invalidated Turkey’s efforts to limit the reach of
the European Convention’s enforcement machinery to “the national territory where the Constitution and the legal
and administrative order of the Republic of Turkey are applied.” See Loizidou, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 65-89.
55
See Legal Consequences, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 107-113 (considering the extraterritoriality of the ICCPR, the
ICESCR, and the CRC). In the Wall case, the ICJ cited concluding observations of the HRC taking note of “‘the
long-standing presence of Israel in [the occupied] territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards their future status,
as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli forces therein’” and concluded that the ICCPR “‘is
applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.’” Id. at ¶ 110.
The situation involving Israel and the Occupied Territories is obviously sui generis and may not be susceptible to
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rights obligations on an occupying power is complicated by the general proposition of
occupation law, termed the “conservationist principle,”56 that local law and institutions should be
preserved57 except insofar as they inhibit mission accomplishment, undermine order and
security, interfere with the occupying power’s ability to adhere to other IHL commitments, or—
increasingly—when local laws or institutions themselves violate international human rights
protections.58 The earlier account of the legislative history of the ICCPR reveals this paradox.
The phenomenon of occupation was at the forefront of delegates’ minds in the 1950s when the
ICCPR was being drafted, and the United States in particular was acutely concerned about
assuming an obligation to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in the areas that it occupied. That
said, in modern times, the resonance of this aspect of the Covenant’s legislative history has
diminished considerably, and adjudicative bodies are comfortable with the general proposition
that areas under occupation fall within a state’s “jurisdiction” for the purpose of applying that
state’s human rights obligations extraterritorially.
Adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative bodies have applied this territorial approach to other
scenarios that fall short of full occupation but still involve de facto control—lawful or
unlawful—of some physical domain within the borders of another state. Such
responsibility will lie where there is “overall control” even if the state party does not
exercise detailed “control over the policies and actions of the authorities in the area
situated outside its national territory.”59 This includes application to peacekeepers, who
are assigned to a particular territory but who remain the responsibility of the troopcontributing state to the extent that the nationality state has the ability to ensure that its
troops respect the rights of the local populace.60 This rationale has also applied to
easy extrapolation to other circumstances. Moreover, Israel is subject to disproportionate attention in human rights
bodies. Nonetheless, the HRC’s conclusion is notable: “in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant
apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories … for all conduct by the State party’s authorities
or agents in those territories affecting the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant.” Human Rights
Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (29 July 2010), at ¶ 5.
56
See generally Gregory H. Fox, Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 237 (Spring 2012); id. at 256-8 (noting tension between states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations
and the conservationist principle of occupation law).
57
For example, Article 43 of the Hague Regulation provides that “the authority of the legitimate power having in
fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Convention [IV] Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct. 1907. See also Article 64, Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) (August 12, 1949), T.I.A.S. 3365.
58
See BENVENISTI, supra note ___, at 92 (finding “an obligation not to enforce local norms that are incompatible
with the obligations to protect the human rights of the occupied population.”).
59
Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (16 Nov. 2004), at ¶ 70.
60
See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Belgium, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/BEL (8 Dec.
1998), at ¶ 6 (stating that the Covenant automatically applies whenever a party “exercises power or effective control
over a person outside its territory ... such as forces constituting a national contingent assigned to an international
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation.”); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
Germany, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1 (4 Nov. 2005) (noting with approval Germany’s assurances that
“[w]herever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when participating in peace missions,
Germany ensures to all persons that they will be granted the rights recognized in the Covenant, insofar as they are
subject to its jurisdiction.”). This position has not been accepted by all troop-contributing states. See Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET (27 Aug. 2001), at ¶ 8;
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situations in which the state exercises authority over more discrete venues, such as
prisons61 or vessels,62 including vessels flying the flag of other nations.63 In fact, some of
the cases challenging the acts of diplomatic or consular officials with respect to
individuals abroad can be assimilated to this more localized territorial theory. As the
spatial unit of analysis becomes smaller and smaller, however, the control-over territory
exception begins to resemble, and eventually collapse into, a test hinging the state’s
exercise of control over persons—both its agents and the victims.64
4. State Control and Authority over Persons
Arguably, a strict application of the territorial control thesis was destined to disappoint in light of
the simple fact that states are capable of violating the rights of individuals abroad without fully
controlling the territory or situs on which those violations occur. The HRC was confronted in
the late 1970s with a set of cross-border abduction cases that led to the development of a stateagent-authority or control-of-persons test. In these snatch-and-grab operations, the HRC held
Uruguay to its human rights obligations when its authorities crossed international borders in
pursuit of individuals and forcibly brought them back into national territory.65 Because the
Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.l (9 April 2003), at ¶ 19 (“[t]he Government disagrees with the Committee’s
suggestion that the provisions of the [ICCPR] are applicable to the conduct of Dutch blue helmets in Srebrenica. ... It
goes without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-à-vis the Netherlands, do not come within the scope of
[Article 2]”).
61
Al-Saadoon, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 79-88 (treating two Iraqi nationals detained in British-controlled military
prisons in Iraq as within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom notwithstanding arguments that the United
Kingdom was not exercising any public powers through the effective control over territory); Al-Jedda v. the United
Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 27021/08 (7 July 2011). In Al-Jedda, the United Kingdom did not advance
the extraterritoriality argument; rather, it argued that the petitioner was under the jurisdiction of the United Nations,
since British troops were operating as part of a multinational force in Iraq. The Court held that because the
petitioner was detained in a facility controlled exclusively by British soldiers, he was within the United Kingdom’s
jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 85.
62
Öcalan v. Turkey, ECHR, Decision on Admissibility, App. No. 46221/99 (14 Dec. 2000). In Öcalan, the
applicant was arrested by Turkish officials while boarding a plane in Nairobi. The strength of this precedent is
somewhat diminished by the fact that Turkey did not raise objections as the court’s ratione loci during the
admissibility phase of the proceedings.
63
Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 3394/03, § 67 (29 Mar. 2010) (finding
applicants within French jurisdiction by virtue of the exercise by French agents of de facto “full and exclusive
control” over a ship and its crew from the time of its interception in international waters “in a continuous and
uninterrupted manner”).
64
See, e.g., Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 136 (“What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and
control over the person in question.”). Indeed, in his separate opinion in Al-Skeini, Judge Rozakis argued that the
state agent and control test should actually be considered a corollary of the territorial control test. Id. at Concurring
Opinion of Judge Rozakis.
65
Lopez-Burgos, supra note ___; Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (1981) (finding the abduction of Uruguayan citizens by Uruguayan agents in Brazil to be a
violation of the applicants’ rights). In Lopez-Burgos, the HRC wrote:
Article 2(1) places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights … but it does
not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under
the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the
acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it. … [I]t would be
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a
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alleged victim was usually a citizen of the state seeking custody, these cases are susceptible to an
alternative explanation premised on nationality; however, the applicable reasoning does not
necessarily confine itself to such facts.66 Moreover, the HRC made clear in General Comment
No. 15 that the ICCPR’s protections extend beyond state party nationals, foreclosing any analogy
to social compact theories that might limit states’ human rights obligations to their own citizens
or subjects.67 The HRC later ratified the control-of-persons standard in General Comment No.
31:
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party. … This principle also applies to
those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained... 68
Applying this concept of agent control or authority over the person is most easily applied in
standard custodial situations, such as prisons,69 which can also be more easily analogized to the
control of territory. This rationale is also regularly invoked, however, in situations in which the

State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.
Id. at ¶ 12.3. For a more modern abduction case, see V.P. Domukovsky et al. v. Georgia, HRC, Comm. No. 623,
624, 626, 627/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/623, 624, 626, 627/1995 (29 May 1998) (Georgia violated applicants’
rights when it abducted them from Azerbaijan, which had refused extradition); Öcalan v. Turkey, ECHR [GC],
Judgment, App. No. 46221/99, (DATE), at ¶ 91 (“directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the
Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the ‘jurisdiction’ of that
State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority
outside its territory.”).
66
The separate opinion of Christian Tomuschat in Lopez-Burgos could be so interpreted:
[t]he formula [“within its territory”] was intended to take care of objective difficulties which might
impede the implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally
unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad,
having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their limited potential. … Never
was it envisaged ... to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and
deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad.
Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), the events which took place outside Uruguay
come within the purview of the Covenant.
Individual opinion submitted by a member of the Human Rights Committee under rule 94 (3) of the Committee’s
provisional rules of procedure, Lopez-Burgos, supra note ___.
67
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15 (11 Apr. 1986), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (“the
general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens” except insofar as a right is applicable only to citizens, such as the right to vote (Article 25)).
68
General Comment No. 31, supra note ___, at ¶ 10.
69
Indeed, in the domestic Al-Skeini proceedings, the U.K. Divisional Court found that military operations in the
field did not fall within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, but the custodial deaths did—a point later conceded by
the government. Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 118.
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individual is in the full custody of the state’s agents, even if not detained in a formal facility.70
This state-agent-authority theory becomes more fraught, however, when remote conduct is at
issue, such when a state harms an individual through extraterritorial targeting decisions involving
lethal force without ever exercising physical custody of the victim.
The first human rights body to confront this hard case was the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in the form of a challenge to the Cuban Air Force’s downing of small civil aircraft
operated by the Brothers to the Rescue in international airspace.71 Without the benefit of much
in the way of prior precedent, the Commission proved remarkably prescient in articulating a
theory of power and authority over the victims, notwithstanding that the victims were never in
the actual custody of Cuban personnel:
The circumstance that the facts occurred outside the Cuban jurisdiction does not
restrict nor limit the Commission’s competent authority ratione loci, for, as has
already been indicated, when agents of a State, whether they be military or civil,
exercise power and authority over persons located outside the national territory,
its obligation to respect human rights, in this case the rights recognized in the
American Declaration, continues.72
Presumably, this reasoning could apply to a whole range of remote extraterritorial killings.
Nonetheless, the ECHR rejected the Commission’s approach in the “Brothers to the Rescue”
case in the controversial Banković case, involving NATO airstrikes on a television station in
Serbia during the 1999 Operation Allied Force.73 Petitioners argued that jurisdiction existed on a
number of grounds: an “effects” test based on actions initiated within the territories of the
respondent states but producing effects in the former Yugoslavia; a control-of-territory test
premised on NATO’s exclusive control of the airspace over Belgrade; and the proportional
application of human rights obligations with reference to the degree of power exercised over the
individual victims. The respondent governments in turn argued that states have human rights
obligations only toward individuals owing some sort of allegiance to the State or in some form of
“structured relationship existing over a period of time.”74
The ECHR adopted a largely territorial approach to the Convention and declared the claims
inadmissible owing to the fact that the extraterritorial act in question did not bring the claimants
into the jurisdiction of the respondent states.75 In so holding, the Court made little of several
other cases involving Turkey (Loizidou, Issa and Öcalan) that were premised upon the
70

Issa, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 55, 74-75 (indicating that, had it been established that Turkish soldiers had taken the
applicants’ relatives into custody in Northern Iraq, taken them to a nearby cave and executed them, the deceased
would have been within Turkish jurisdiction by virtue of the soldiers’ authority and control over them).
71
Armando Alejandre, Jr. et al. v. Cuba, IAComm’nHR, Report No. 86/99, Case No. 11,589 (Sept. 29, 1999). Cuba
did not contest the case, so the Inter-American Commission’s reasoning does not benefit from the state’s views.
72
Id. at ¶ 25.
73
Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, Adm. Decision, App. No. 52207/99 (12 Dec. 2001).
74
Id. at ¶¶ 30-53 (setting forth parties’ arguments and counter-arguments).
75
Banković, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 75, 81. Indeed, the ECHR also saw the potential for a clash of authority and
indicated that any NATO obligations would be inferior and subordinated to the obligations of the territorial state.
Id. at ¶¶ 59-60.
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extraterritorial actions of Turkish state agents. These cases could be distinguished because,
although they had already been deemed admissible, the respondent state had either not yet
challenged admissibility or the merits were still pending.76 The ECHR also justified departing
from this line of precedent with reference to the essentially regional character of the European
Convention. So, in the Cyprus line of cases, a finding that Turkey’s obligations did not apply
extraterritorially would have denied human rights protections to individuals who would normally
have enjoyed them and left what amounted to a rights void. By contrast, Banković involved
harm to citizens of Serbia—which at the time fell outside the espace juridique of the European
Convention—who had no history or expectation of protection from the Convention.77 This
regional approach to the extraterritoriality question is unique to the ECHR and has been largely
abandoned in its more recent jurisprudence.78
It cannot be gainsaid that the outcome in Banković may have been motivated by a number of
extra-legal concerns, including a devotion to the humanitarian impulses behind the Operation,
which was launched in order to halt and prevent egregious violations of human rights. Indeed,
the respondent states argued that asserting jurisdiction over the facts at bar would discourage
states from contributing to such missions.79 Moreover, Banković was decided after 9/11 and just
after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, which may also have heightened the ECHR’s
sensitivities to assigning human rights obligations in extraterritorial armed conflict situations.80
Although Banković threatened to significantly curtail the extraterritorial reach of the European
Convention, subsequent cases have all but limited it to its facts.81 Issa v. Turkey, for example,
involved the abduction and extrajudicial killing of Iraqi shepherds, allegedly by Turkish forces
operating in northern Iraq—another state outside the espace juridique of the European
Convention.82 The Court confirmed that:
According to the relevant principles of international law, a State’s responsibility
may be engaged where, as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or
unlawful—that State in practice exercises effective control of an area situated
outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights
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and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control,
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a
subordinate local administration. It is not necessary to determine whether a
Contracting Party actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions
of the authorities in the area situated outside its national territory, since even
overall control of the area may engage the responsibility of the Contracting Party
concerned.83
Looking to the HRC’s Uruguayan line of cases, the ECHR held that “the Convention cannot be
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory
of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”84 Likewise, in Öcalan v.
Turkey, another cross-border arrest case, the applicant—Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) leader
Abdullah Öcalan—was arrested in Kenya by Turkish security services. The ECHR ruled that as
soon as he was transferred from Kenyan to Turkish custody, the individual in question was under
“effective Turkish authority and control and was therefore brought within the ‘jurisdiction’ of
that State.”85 In Medvedyev, the ECHR offered another somewhat garbled way to distinguish
Banković when it noted that the primarily territorial notion of jurisdiction “excluded situations,
however, where—as in the Banković case—what was at issue was an instantaneous
extraterritorial act, as the provisions of Article 1 did not admit of a ‘cause-and-effect’ notion of
jurisdiction.”86
Issa and Öcalan involved victims in the custody of state agents. Even more telling, Pad and
Others v. Turkey was brought by the families of several Iranian individuals killed by fire from a
Turkish helicopter patrolling the border. That the facts were unclear as to whether the events in
question occurred on Turkish or Iranian soil was of no moment since “the Court considers that it
is not required to determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the
Government has already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused the
killing of the applicants’ relatives…”87 The causal role of the state in the rights violation proved
relevant in Pad’s finding that the victims fell within the state’s jurisdiction as compared to
Medvedyev’s rejection of the relevance of causality.
The impact of Banković diminished even further once Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom came
before the ECHR.88 In the domestic incarnation of Al-Skeini, the British lower courts adopted
the Banković reasoning to reject claims by Iraqi citizens who were fatally shot by British soldiers
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during patrols and search-and-arrest operations in Iraq.89 When this case reached the ECHR
(with Article 13 claims alleging that the U.K. failed to conduct an appropriate investigation as
opposed to claims under Article 2 alleging violations of the right to life), a newly constituted
chamber of the Court largely rejected the Banković reasoning. Instead, the ECHR held:
the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of
security in South East Iraq. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court
considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security
operations in Basrah during the period in question, exercised authority and control
over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish
a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.90
At least part of this finding hinges on the fact that the United Kingdom voluntarily undertook
responsibility for the maintenance of security in the region following the removal from power of
the Ba’ath regime and prior to the establishment of an Interim Government.91 On balance, this
affirmative assumption of responsibility coupled with clear causality and the close proximity
between the victims and British agents established the “jurisdictional link” necessary to satisfy
Article 1 of the European Convention.92
In the meantime, the Inter-American Commission was confronted with facts similar to those at
issue in Banković in an inter-state claim brought by Ecuador against Colombia on behalf of an
Ecuadoran victim of Operation Phoenix, during which the Colombian Air Forces bombed a
FARC camp located within Ecuador.93 The aerial bombing was followed by a ground incursion
in which some of the wounded and killed were removed.94 Colombia contested jurisdiction on
the ground that Operation Phoenix did not entail military occupation or control over Ecuadoran
territory or armed groups therein.95 Acknowledging Banković,96 the Commission determined
that:
the exercise of authority over persons by agents of a State even if not acting
within their territory, without necessarily requiring the existence of a formal,
structured and prolonged legal relation in terms of time to raise the responsibility
of a State for acts committed by its agents abroad. At the time of examining the
scope of the American Convention’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine
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whether there is a causal nexus between the extraterritorial conduct of the State
and the alleged violation of the rights and freedoms of an individual.97
The Commission adopted a calibrated approach when it held:
[This] does not necessarily mean that a duty to guarantee the catalogue of
substantive rights established in the American Convention may necessarily be
derived from a State’s territorial activities, including all the range of obligations
with respect to persons who are under its jurisdiction for the (entire) time the
control by its agents lasted. Instead, the obligation does arise in the period of time
that agents of a State interfere in the lives of persons who are on the territory of
the other State, for those agents to respect their rights, in particular, their right to
life and humane treatment.98
For the purposes of admissibility, the Commission determined that Colombia exercised
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the area attacked.99
In light of the above, it remains to be seen how the ECHR will address scenarios that fall
between the facts of Banković (wherein state agents are entirely remote from the victim in
question, exercise little to no territorial control, but can still cause harm through air superiority or
the deployment of remote weaponry) and those of Al-Skeini (wherein the state voluntarily
assumed some measure of control over a territory and a population in a situation of quasioccupation). At a minimum, Issa, Pad, and Al-Skeini lay the groundwork for a revisiting of
Banković’s reliance on a territorial control as a precondition to hold a state responsible for the
commission of remote extrajudicial killings. Obviously, as the state and its agents and
instrumentalities become more and more remote, the jurisdictional link between the state and the
victim could become too attenuated to extend the obligations of the European Convention.
However, the paradox of allowing a state to avoid its human rights obligations by remaining
distant in its choice of means and methods of war will not be lost on human rights
adjudicators.100 Arguably, the operator of a remotely piloted vehicle exercises the same degree
of control—if not more so—over his or her target as the British troops exercised over their
victims in Issa.
5. Gestalt Approaches
The human rights bodies have evinced a tendency to proceed case-by-case, in keeping with the
non ultra petita rule, rather advance more generally applicable principles. Although this iterative
approach to a new doctrinal area is common, in this context, it has generated an academic
critique that the human rights bodies, and the ECHR in particular, have failed to create a
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coherent doctrinal framework for determining the extraterritorial reach of state’ human rights
obligations.101 Accordingly, particular judges and commentators have advanced more gestalt
approaches. For example, Judge Bonello in Al-Skeini argued in his separate opinion that events
should fall within a state “jurisdiction” whenever the state is capable of performing the basic
obligations of a functional human rights regime: refraining from violations, investigating
complaints of abuses, punishing responsible individuals, and compensating victims.102
Conversely, territory, individuals, or events would fall outside the state’s jurisdiction in
situations in which a state is not in a position to respect or to ensure particular rights because it
could not control the rights abusers, could not investigate complaints, could not punish
responsible individuals, or could not compensate the victims. This capacity-based analysis
ensures that human rights obligations are not “interpreted in such a way as to impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden” on states.103 Thus:
It is quite possible to envisage situations in which a Contracting State, in its role
as an occupying power, has well within its authority the power not to commit
torture or extra-judicial killings, to punish those who commit them and to
compensate the victims—but at the same time that Contracting State does not
have the extent of authority and control required to ensure to all persons the right
to education or the right to free and fair elections: those fundamental rights it can
enforce would fall squarely within its jurisdiction, those it cannot, on the wrong
side of the bright line.104
In other words, obligations should be commensurate with capacity. The theory that
causation and capacity create the necessary “jurisdictional link” would more easily
govern remote targeting decisions that are clearly attributable to the state but that might
not entail any exercise of physical control over the victims. In addition, rather than
premising responsibility on a theory of control over the individual analogized from the
control-over-territory precedent, a system could be devised that hinges on the
“relationship between the individual and the state in relation to a violation of any of the
rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever the violations occurred”105 and the fact that the
state exercises causal control over the “facts and circumstances that allegedly constitute a
violation of a human rights.”106
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Any more functional or calibrated theory of the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations will depend on a willingness to accept the divisibility of the human rights corpus—a
corollary doctrinal dilemma that gave some decision-makers pause early on. There are two ways
this corpus may be sliced: one approach focuses on the types of substantive rights that may—as a
matter of logic, status, and practicality—apply extraterritorially. The second focuses on the
types of state obligations (i.e., the duty to respect rights versus the duty to ensure or even to
promote them) that may—also as a matter of logic and practicality—apply extraterritorially. It
should be noted that the question is not whether the individuals who are being acted upon enjoy
the entire corpus of human rights—they do. Rather, the question is: which state should be the
guarantor of those rights? When a state acts on the territory of another sovereign, it may assume
certain human rights obligations vis-à-vis the citizens and residents of that territory that apply in
parallel with the extant obligations of the territorial state. Under other circumstances, such as
total occupation, the foreign state may fully displace the territorial state as rights guarantor.
The early impulse of many human rights bodies was to insist upon the indivisibility of the corpus
of human rights.107 Indeed, in Banković, the ECHR resisted the applicants’ claims that rights
should apply proportionately to the degree of control over the individuals exercised by the
state.108 This perspective was rights-promoting in that it guarded against efforts to rank order or
even to divide and conquer rights. This insistence on unity, however, invited binary arguments
in opposition to efforts to apply certain rights extraterritorially in circumstances in which it might
be appropriate. Opponents need only raise the specter of a foreign state owing an obligation to
promote the right to education, religion, or political participation when it acts abroad to undercut
extraterritoriality arguments.
In the alternative, or in addition, the extraterritorial application of rights may be disaggregated
with reference to the nature of the state’s obligation vis-à-vis the right rather than the nature of
the substantive right itself. As discussed, human rights treaties articulate different types of
obligations with respect to their enumerated rights. The obligation to “respect” a particular right
creates a “duty of forbearance” and hinges on the state’s own conduct as manifested by the
actions of its agents and instrumentalities.109 Obligations to respect a right obliges the state to
refrain from actions that would violate the right or impede its enjoyment. The obligation to
“ensure” a right implies more positive obligations, including a duty to take positive steps toward
the enjoyment of the right as well as to protect individuals from abuses of the right committed by
third parties. The obligation to “fulfil” a right may require a state party to undertake an
expenditure of resources to actively promote the enjoyment of the right and otherwise create the
conditions necessary for the full enjoyment of the right. These latter types of obligations may be
difficult, if not impossible, to realize extraterritorially in situations in which there is another
sovereign with more direct and immediate control of the instrumentalities that would normally
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ensure and promote those rights, such as schools, courts, etc. The obligation to respect a
particular right, however, is always within the control of the state, even when it acts
extraterritorially.110 Accordingly, a proportional approach would place duties to respect rights on
states on a lesser showing of territorial or physical control than duties to ensure rights.
Human rights bodies are increasingly comfortable with the idea of a sliding scale of rights and
obligations that hinges on the particular circumstances of the foreign state’s presence and actions
within the territorial state.111 The greater the degree of presence, power, and control, the more
obligations might apply.112 And, extraterritorial obligations might apply to fundamental rights
on a lesser showing of presence than to other rights. Such an approach maps nicely onto the
taxonomy of scenarios set forth above. In particular, extraterritorial custodial cases are relatively
easy; under those circumstances, the custodial state is entirely capable of protecting a number of
rights that are implicated by such situations (e.g., the right to physical integrity and to be free
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; certain due process rights to fair
notice and judicial review; and the right to equal protection and to be free from discrimination on
invidious grounds). While these rights can be certainly guaranteed by the custodial state, it
would be unreasonable to expect that state to accord the entire range of human rights to detainees
as well as to other individuals within a foreign territory who occupy a different relationship with
the foreign state. These individuals are no less rights bearing, but they must assert those rights
against their national sovereign. Human rights bodies have proven themselves perhaps more
comfortable assigning obligations to investigate extraterritorial rights violations when the state’s
responsibility for the violation itself is not at issue.113 The downside of moving away from the
idea of indivisibility is that it becomes necessary to determine the applicability of each and every
right and obligation in the circumstances at bar.
6. Conclusion
Although this jurisprudence started with a simple presumption that human rights obligations are
essentially territorial, over the years the recognized exceptions—borne of compelling fact
patterns involving manifestly harmful extraterritorial state action in situations in which the state
was perfectly capable of respecting the right in question—have proliferated. Like beads of
mercury, these exceptions have coalesced into a generalized doctrine of extraterritorial
application. The current state of the law would thus dictate that human rights obligations exist
wherever a state exercises de facto authority or control over territory, individuals, or a
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transaction and has the power to respect and ensure the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. The
proposition that human rights obligations apply extraterritorially to situations of occupation and
detention is close to categorical, with situations involving lesser territorial or personal control
being subject to more of a case-by-case analysis that turns on the particular facts and the degree
of control exercised. The state-agent-authority test is likewise easiest to apply in situations in
which the putative victim was in detention or otherwise in the sole custody of the extraterritorial
state. It remains more contested as the state becomes increasingly remote from the victim. Both
tests can be assimilated under the aegis of a test premised on capacity: if the state has the
capacity to both violate and rectify the violation of the right, then the obligation to respect that
right applies extraterritorially. The United States’ categorical position on extraterritoriality can
be evaluated against this doctrinal backdrop.
D. The United States
Although not subject to the ECHR, or to any institution with the power to enforce its judgment or
views against it, the United States does have treaty obligations requiring it to undertake periodic
reporting and defend its policies and actions before human rights experts bodies, such as the
HRC and the Committee Against Torture, and also to respond to individual petitions before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.114 Most claims alleging that the United States
has not adhered to its human rights obligations while acting extraterritorially involve situations
of armed conflict in which deployed U.S. troops and other personnel have caused harm. In its
filings in response to such claims before the various human rights bodies, the United States
originally relied on the argument that these institutions lacked competence over factual scenarios
governed by IHL as a function of their subject matter jurisdiction limitations. In any case, it has
argued that its human rights obligations are suspended in armed conflict situations governed by
IHL—the lex specialis. To the extent that United States addressed these issues at all, it did so
only as a matter of “courtesy” rather than out of a sense of legal compulsion.115 Since 1995 in
the HRC, however, the United States has more expressly advanced the additional jurisdictional
defense that its human rights obligations do not apply extraterritorially under any circumstances.
Even prior to the initiation of so-called Global War on Terror, the United States has been subject
to claims premised on extraterritorial human rights obligations. Most importantly, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights received several petitions against the United States
involving operations in Haiti, Grenada, and Panama. By way of a jurisdictional defense in the
Coard case—which involved allegations following the invasion of Grenada that the U.S. troops
had mistreated individuals in detention and then manipulated the judicial system to deprive them
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of a fair trial116—the United States argued that the impugned detentions were consistent with the
applicable IHL, which the Commission had no mandate or expertise to apply.117 The
extraterritorial application vel non of the American Declaration, which contains no territorial or
jurisdictional limitation,118 was not briefed by the parties. Nonetheless, the Commission noted
sua sponte:
While the extraterritorial application of the American Declaration has not been
placed at issue by the parties, the Commission finds it pertinent to note that, under
certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extraterritorial locus will not only be consistent with, but required by, the norms which
pertain. … Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s
humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any
person subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons
within a state’s territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with
an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of
one state, but subject to the control of another state—usually through the acts of
the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed
victim’s nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but on
whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a
person subject to its authority and control.119
Following these early cases, the United States’ detention program on the Guantánamo Bay Naval
Base and its operations in Afghanistan and other theaters brought to the fore additional such
claims. For example, lawyers representing individuals detained on Guantánamo sought
precautionary measures (i.e., injunctive relief) from the Inter-American Commission. At the
outset, the United States raised multiple jurisdictional arguments: that the Commission was
without jurisdiction to issue precautionary measures against a state not party to the InterAmerican Convention; that the Commission had no jurisdiction over claims governed by IHL,120
which governs the capture and detention of enemy combatants in armed conflict; and that the
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petitioners failed to exhaust local remedies.121 In responding to the United States’ lex specialis
argument, the Commission adopted what amounts to an authority and control test to justify its
exercise of jurisdiction:
where persons find themselves within the authority and control of a state and
where a circumstance of armed conflict may be involved, their fundamental rights
may be determined in part by reference to international humanitarian law as well
as international human rights law. … In short, no person, under the authority and
control of a state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal
protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable rights.122
The precautionary measures imposed with respect to all the detainees were twice extended in
2005 and again in 2013 (the latter on the Commission’s own initiative), although these have had
little apparent force or effect on U.S. policy.123 In an individual petition brought on behalf of an
Algerian detainee, Djamel Ameziane, the Commission considered the petitioner to be within the
United States’ jurisdiction during three distinct phases: his capture in Pakistan, his temporary
detention in a U.S. airbase in Kandahar, and his continued detention on Guantanamo. In so
holding, the Commission reasoned that throughout this time period, the United States and its
agents exercised exclusive physical power and control over the petitioner.124
This issue has arisen in the Committee Against Torture (CAT) with respect to the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In its
Second Periodic Report, which was due in 2001 but filed in 2005, the United States provided
extensive information regarding its overseas operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with little
discussion of the extraterritorial application vel non of the Torture Convention.125 Nonetheless,
in its responses to questions from the CAT, the United States noted that many legal obligations
within the treaty (such as the non-refoulement principle) do “not apply to activities undertaken
outside of the ‘territory under [the] jurisdiction’ of the United States. The United States does not
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accept the concept that ‘de facto control’ equates to territory under its jurisdiction.”126 In its
Concluding Observations, the CAT rejected the lex specialis argument and noted that the treaty
applies to “all areas under the de facto effective control of the State Party, by whichever military
or civil authorities such control is exercised.” It deemed “regrettable” the United States’ contrary
views that the treaty applies only to states’ de jure territory.127 In its combined Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Report, the United States did not go into detail on the territorial scope of the treaty; it
did, however, provide information on a range of offshore activities—such as overseas detention
and intelligence operations—as if it had conceded the treaty’s extraterritorial application.128
Turning to the Human Rights Committee, in the United States’ first periodic submission to the
HRC in 1994,129 there was no mention of any territorial limitations, even though the Committee
had already pronounced on several fact patterns involving extraterritorial conduct by states
parties.130 By the time of the HRC hearing, however, the United States was involved in military
operations in Haiti, and a challenge had been lodged against the high-seas interdiction of Haitian
refugees.131 In its oral presentation, the United States delegation argued that the obligations of
the treaty are limited to a party’s territory by virtue of the formulation of Article 2(1) and the
intent of drafters.132 In its Concluding Observations, the HRC took issue with this position and
critiqued the United States’ refusal to provide any information on its overseas operations.133
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In 2005, the United States filed its combined Second and Third Report (after being in arrears) in
the HRC.134 In this report, the United States offered its analysis of the territorial limitations of
the ICCPR, including the conjunctive interpretation of Article 2(1), and concluded that:
[T]he obligations assumed by a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights apply only within the territory of the State Party.135
Because in its estimation the text was clear, the United States asserted that there was no need to
resort to the travaux préparatoires as an interpretative device. Nonetheless, it argued that the
records indicated that “within its territory” was included within Article 2(1) to “make clear that
states would not be obligated to ensure the rights recognized therein outside their territories.”136
In response to questions about the legal status of persons detained in Afghanistan, Guantánamo,
Iraq, and elsewhere, the United States advanced lex specialis arguments to the effect that the
“legal status and treatment of such persons is governed by the law of war.”137 The HRC
contested these claims in its Concluding Observations.138 In its 2008 follow-up comments, the
United States maintained its position that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially, but it did
provide some of the information requested “as a courtesy” to the Committee, including on
“matters outside the scope of the Covenant,” such as detention operations on Guantánamo and
elsewhere.139
In its 2011 Fourth Periodic Report to the HRC,140 the United States took note of the Concluding
Observations of the HRC, including the recommendation that it “review its approach to the
interpretation of the Covenant.”141 It then proceeded to largely back off its prior position that
international human rights law does not apply to situations governed by IHL. In particular, the
United States averred:
With respect to the application of the Covenant and the international law of armed
conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law or “IHL”), the United
States has not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply “in time of
war.” Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to
matters within its scope of application.142
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The United States continued by noting that “typically” it is IHL that regulates the conduct of
states in armed conflict situations, according to the doctrine of lex specialis. In the next breath,
however, the U.S. submission stated:
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that international human rights law
and the law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and mutually
reinforcing. These two bodies of law contain many similar protections [such as
the prohibition against torture].143
Later, the submission noted that the choice of law question is context- and fact-specific:
Determining the international law rule that applies to a particular action taken by
a government in the context of an armed conflict is a fact-specific determination,
which cannot be easily generalized, and raises especially complex issues in the
context of non-international armed conflicts occurring within a State’s own
territory.144
The Fourth Periodic Report was not, by contrast, as forthcoming or progressive when it comes to
the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. After coyly acknowledging its prior
position against extraterritoriality, the United States specifically took notice of three important
legal sources setting forth the contrary view. The paragraph states in full:
The United States in its prior appearances before the Committee has articulated
the position that article 2(1) would apply only to individuals who were both
within the territory of a State Party and within that State Party’s jurisdiction. The
United States is mindful that in General Comment 31 (2004) the Committee
presented the view that “States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to
respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State
party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated
within the territory of the State Party.” The United States is also aware of the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which has found the
ICCPR “applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
jurisdiction outside its own territory,” as well as positions taken by other States
Parties.145
These passages suggest both a more relaxed understanding of the relationship between IHL and
human rights law and an imperative to harmonize legal obligations when there is no direct
contradiction between them. In addition, the submission suggests that it is the United States’
view that there may be aspects of a state’s conduct that are, in fact, governed by human rights
law, even during situations of armed conflicts—all of which are taking place outside of United
143
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States’ territory. This implies the majority conflict-of-laws position that human rights law can be
employed as an interpretive aid to add content to undefined terms in IHL, such as “judicial
guarantees” and “humane treatment,” or to expound upon treaty obligations, as in situations of
occupation or detention when the occupying state exercises plenary power over territory or
individuals. Although the United States also indicated a willingness to engage in further
dialogue on these issues,146 the United States declined to elaborate in response to the HRC’s list
of priority issues prepared in advance of its “constructive dialogue” with the Committee now
scheduled for March 2014.147
E. The Way Forward
Two distinct trends are apparent in the above account. The first is the gradual convergence of
the law emerging from the various human rights courts and experts bodies that have been
confronted with the question of when states’ human rights obligations apply abroad. According
to this jurisprudence, these obligations apply whenever a state’s agents or instrumentalities
exercise control, authority, or power over the individuals whose rights are in jeopardy, such as by
virtue of states’ control of territory, their custody of the individuals in question, their practical
ability to respect and ensure rights, or their essential role in a causal chain leading to the
violations. Although this approach is still somewhat in flux in the ECHR, the extent to which
these obligations apply extraterritorially is increasingly calibrated to the degree of control the
state exercises over the situation in question. Obligations to respect rights, which can be adhered
to whenever and wherever states act, attach sooner than obligations to ensure or fulfil rights,
which may require the ability to mobilize an array of state institutions that is unavailable to states
when they act offshore. The second trend is the growing isolation of the United States in its
categorical position that its human rights obligations have no extraterritorial application in light
of the text of the relevant instruments and the intentions of the drafters.
Although the United States has since the Bush Administration endeavored to preserve this legal
argument, it is time to change course. The United States should use the opportunity of the
upcoming Human Rights Committee hearings to relinquish this increasingly untenable and
ultimately pointless position. By accepting the graduated and fact-specific approach uniformly
adopted by the human rights bodies, the United States can preserve its ability to argue that its
obligations do not apply in particular situations, while accepting that they do apply in other wellestablished contexts that should be uncontroversial, even for the United States—viz. when the
state exercises plenary authority and control over territory within the borders of another state or
when the state holds individuals abroad in its exclusive custody.
Although every litigator endeavors to win on threshold jurisdictional defenses, relinquishing this
particular argument is unlikely to significantly disadvantage the United States since it will retain
a number of more compelling defenses down the rhetorical cascade. In particular, in the most
critical NIAC scenarios, the United States can focus its energies on bolstering its lex specialis
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argument by educating human rights institutions on its views as to the reach of IHL. Moreover,
it has well-developed arguments on the merits as to why its conduct either does not run afoul of
its human rights obligations or is otherwise justified. The receptivity of these bodies to more
substantive arguments will be enhanced with the distraction of an antagonistic extraterritoriality
argument out of the way. Indeed, it could be argued that because the policies so often at issue
here are so momentous, the United States should be willing set aside hyper-legalized stratagems
altogether and defend its actions on the merits.
To be sure, the United States uniquely vulnerable to claims that it has violated the rights of
individuals abroad given the degree to which it has stationed troops and other personnel abroad
and the nature of the armed conflicts and counter-terrorism operations in which it is engaged.
And yet, in considering this proposal, the United States should keep some perspective. The
United States is not subject to any human rights court or tribunal with the power to enforce a
judgment against it. And, the option of simply ignoring, or acknowledging while opposing, the
pronouncements of a treaty body is always available to the United States. To be sure, there are
costs to a finding of responsibility by a human rights institution and to refusing to bring its
conduct more fully into compliance with its views. These include reputational costs (such as loss
of prestige) and damage to the United States’ self-image as a rights-respecting nation that
adheres to the rule of law. And yet, the concrete implications that would follow from
abandoning an increasingly strained argument are minimal, particularly given that the United
States is already subject to many of the same legal rules by virtue of other treaties, such as the
Geneva Conventions, whose extraterritorial application is uncontested.148
In any case, a fervent fealty to this legal position is having little practical effect. The United
States’ actions overseas are already subject to searching review by these human rights bodies. 149
The United States has largely consented to this process, “as a courtesy.” This attitude no doubt
reflects a certain degree of deference to these institutions and to other elements of the
international community, but also the pragmatic recognition that responding to allegations of
serious abuses with a weak jurisdictional defense followed by silence on the merits will be
counter-productive. At the same time, a willingness to respond vigorously to allegations on the
merits offers the United States a forum to advance its legal justifications for its actions, proffer
factual details and clarifications, address common misconceptions and hyperbole, announce
important reforms to law and policy, and admit that our record is not perfect.150 Indeed, the U.S.
interventions have been increasingly humble in light of the serious allegations at issue,151 while
at the same time, defending U.S. actions when justified.152 The United States has come a long
way in its willingness to report on, and entertain questions about, its overseas activities; reverting
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to total silence is no longer a realistic option. As such, it is unclear why the United States feels
so compelled to preserve this argument.
Indeed, the proposed change of course may inure to the United States’ benefit in other ways. In
addition to enhancing the legitimacy of its other arguments, accepting this case-by-case approach
will ensure that the United States’ position is better aligned with the views of, and obligations
placed on, its coalition partners and other allies. As a practical matter, when the United States
acts in coalition, it needs to harmonize its actions with its allies who increasingly accept—some
more grudgingly than others—that they are bound by their human rights obligations when they
operate abroad. For many of these allies, this includes obligations under the European
Convention and its more robust enforcement regime.153 Subjecting the United States to the same
legal framework as our allies will encourage collaboration by ensuring that all parties involved in
a particular operation or transaction will be judged by the same standards and have the same
potential exposure to censure.154
Finally, perhaps the most compelling reason for the United States to adopt a different approach is
deontological: because it is the right thing to do. A global human rights system that allows states
to act without constraints when they are offshore is untenable. It would invite impunity and,
worse, the outsourcing of violations, particularly in this era of globalization. Some measure of
extraterritorial application ensures that states’ human rights obligations follow them when they
exercise control, power, or authority over territory, persons, or transactions abroad. All that said,
it will obviously be difficult for the United States to give up an argument that has become almost
axiomatic in its interventions in human rights fora. This may be all the more so without a
permanent Legal Adviser in place in the U.S. State Department. Nonetheless, the time has come
for the United States to relinquish a legal argument that is neither persuasive, efficacious, nor
beneficial.
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